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EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
PENAL LEGISLATIONt
B. ]. George, Jr.*
of the most difficult words in the legal lexicon to delineate
is the term "jurisdiction"; it is equally difficult to relate this
term to the concept of "venue."1 The term "jurisdiction" is constantly
invoked by courts in a variety of contexts, some relating to geography, some to governmental and judicial structure, some to legislative or judicial power, some to persons, and some to procedures.
Thus, it is difficult to discern a common thread of meaning or a
consistent pattern of application from the cases in which the word
appears.
At times, of course, the term "jurisdiction" is used merely as a
handy verbal tool to justify what a court is about to do with a case.
For example, habeas corpus in its traditional form lies to test only
"jurisdictional" matters.2 A court can therefore justify the granting
of extraordinary relief by referring to errors or defects as "jurisdictional." It can also avoid a litigant's request to disturb an existing legal status by calling a matter "non-jurisdictional" and hold-.
ing any error to have been waived by failure to raise it at an.earlier
time.
Even if the labeling function is eliminated from consideration,
however, there is still evidence of lack of definition and of shifting
meaning in the "substantive" application of the word. This point
may be illustrated by the fact that the following questions can all
be labeled "jurisdictional":

O

NE

I. Can a legislature extend statutory coverage to a particular
2.
3.
4.
5.

social problem?
Did the legislature do so?
Can a legislature enact laws for a particular place?
Did it in fact do so?
Is a particular court constitutionally in existence?

t This article is adapted from the American national report for the Seventh Congress of Comparative Law, to be held in Uppsala, Sweden, during August 6-13, 1966.
The report will be submitted by the author on Topic V-B-1, "The Competence of
Criminal Courts Over Offenses Committed Abroad."
.
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed.
I. "In the broad sense, venue, as applied to criminal cases, means the place in which
prosecutions are to begin; while jurisdiction means the power of the court to hear
and to determine the case. The terms are not synonymous.'' Williams v. State, 145
Tex. Crim. 536, 540, 170 S.W.2d 482, 485 (1943).
2. Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830); People v. Harris, 266 Mich. 207,
294 N.W. 156 (1940); Matter of Morhous v. Supreme Court, 293 N.Y. 131, 56 N.E.2d
79 (1944).
(609]
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6. Can it hear the class of cases to which a particular case
belongs?
7. Has the pleading in the case been properly presented?
8. Does the pleading include a proper legal statement of the
offense?
9. Are the proper people-defendant, prosecuting attorney,
judge, and jury-physically before the court?
10. Have all required procedural acts been done properly and
in the correct sequence?
It is evident that some of these questions relate to the powers of the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the government and
the rest to safeguards accorded private citizens; some are substantive
and some are procedural.
If one tries to separate the matter of "venue" from these "jurisdictional" problems, he becomes even more confused. Venue is supposed to relate to the place of trial of a particular case, while jurisdiction has to do with the broader issue of judicial power to act.
However, a court is not to act if venue has been improperly laid,
and if a court is powerless to act for one reason or another, the trial
of the particular case cannot be entrusted to it. Thus, the relationship between these two terms is essentially circular. Accordingly,
the fundamental problem is not particularly one of imprecise judicial usage of language, but rather of long-continued failure of the
Anglo-American legal system to analyze clearly (1) the differences
between legislative power and competence and judicial power and
competence, (2) the scope of penal legislation and procedural law,
and (3) the relationship between convenience in the general and
fairness in the particular.
This confusion in Anglo-American law contrasts sharply with
the traditional classification of equivalent problems in civil-law systems. In civil-law countries a definite line is drawn between the
question of the territorial application of penal legislation on the
one hand, and the procedural matter of choice of the forum in which
an apprehended offender is to be tried on the other. The first problem is generally resolved within the substantive penal law. Most
foreign penal codes state explicitly when citizens may be punished
for acts which they commit abroad,8 when resident aliens may be
punished for activity done while they are temporarily outside the
3. See DANISH CRIMINAL CODE art. 7; GERMAN PENAL CODE § 3; JAPANESE PENAL
CODE arts. 3, 4; JAPANESE DRAFr PENAL CODE arts. 2, 3; NORWEGIAN PENAL CODE § 12;
CRIMINAL CODE OF THE R.S.F.S.R. art. 5. See also ANDENAES, THE GENERAL PART OF TIIE
CRIMINAL CODE OF NORWAY 318-21 (Ogle transl. 1965); FELDBRUGGE, SOVIET CRIMINAL
I.Aw: THE GENERAL PART 67-69 (Vol. 9, Law in Eastern Europe, 1964). The French
provisions are now contained in the CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE arts. 689, 695.
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forum state,~ and when nonresident aliens may be punished .for acts
done in their mvn country or in a third country.5 Thus, these penal
codes provide general standards by which a court can determine
whether a prosecution can properly be based on conduct which took
place beyond the borders of the country in which it sits. Foreign
criminal procedure codes, on the other hand, provide norms -by
which prosecuting officials can determine whether their office or
another office should initiate action in a local court. 6 If, as may be
the case, the same matter is simultaneously laid before two or more
courts, guidelines are provided to determine the proper forum. 7 A
change in the location of trial can also be ordered on the basis of
a defendant's request; however, such a request is subject to the discretion of the courts.8
The foregoing substantive and procedural rules have much to
offer Anglo-American jurisprudence. Confusion in the use of the
terms "jurisdiction" and "venue" might be cleared away to a substantial degree if we would first set aside those cases in which the
word "jurisdiction" is used to explain the courts' refusal to hear
particular cases on appeal or in extraordinary-writ proceedings, and
then evaluate the remaining issues on a functional basis. If we are
concerned primarily with whether domestic criminal legislation
can be invoked against individuals who have committed physical
acts outside the boundaries of the state or country in which the
court sits, the matter is one of "legislative competence." So viewed,
the legal rules which determine the scope of extraterritorial application of criminal statutes form a specialized canon of construction
within which a particular penal-law provision on theft, counterfeiting, tax evasion, or other offense is to be interpreted.
After the rather broad issue concerning the scope of application of the legislation has been resolved, or in a case in which the
coverage of the legislation is undisputed, the only matter still to be
decided is the choice of a court in which to maintain the particular
prosecution. The class of courts in which various criminal prosecutions are to be brough~ may be ascertained from the language of the
4.
5.

See DANISH CRIMINAL CODE art. 7; NORWEGIAN PENAL CODE § 12.
See DANISH CRIMINAL CODE art. 8; FRENCH CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE art. 694;
GERMAN PENAL CODE § 4; JAPANESE PENAL CODE art. 2; JAPANESE DRAFT PENAL CODE
arts. 4, 5; NORWEGIAN PENAL CODE § 12; CRIMINAL CODE OF THE R.S.F.S.R. art. 5.
6. See FRENCH CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE arts. 52, 382, 388, 522, 662; GERMAN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE arts. 7-15; JAPANESE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE arts. 2-16;
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE OF THE R.S.F.S.R. arts. 41-45.
7. See DANDO, THE JAPANESE LAw OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 63-68 (George transl.

1966).
8. FRENCH CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE art. 662; JAPANESE CRIMINAL
art. 19; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE OF THE R.S.F.S.R. art. 44.

PROCEDURE CODE
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constitution and the statutes which create and organize the judiciary.
When there are several courts of the same or different classes which
are all competent to hear a particular case, then a determination of
the place in which the prosecution is finally to be maintained may
be reached by striking a balance between the practical needs of the
moving party to prove his case and of the defendant to prepare
and present his defense.
Therefore, unusual as this method of analysis is in the traditions
of the com:i;n.on law, I would like. to analyze the American law of
"jurisdiction" and "venue" by looking first to the substantive legal
basis for taking account of activity outside the borders of the forum
state, and then turning to the procedural question of where a particular prosecution may be laid after the criminal statute has in
fact been violated.

I.

THEORETICAL BASES IN FEDERAL AND STATE

LAw

FOR AssERTING JuRISDICI'ION
OVER OFFENSES COMMITTED ExTRATERRITORIALLY

There are two polar extremes from which one can depart in
deciding whether a state can reach out by legislation to penalize
criminal acts committed outside its borders. At one extreme is the
premise that a legislature cannot act with respect to a particular matter unless it is specifically au·thorized to do so in the constitution or
other basic document which sets forth its powers. In this respect,
silence is as disabling as a specific prohibition. Rigid application
of this premise in American law eliminates the problem of extraterritorial legislation at the outset, because state constitutions are
generally silent on the power of the legislature to enact statutes
with extraterritorial application.
The opposite premise is that all states have certain sovereign
· powers which they can exercise without transgressing the rights of
other states under international law. If they fail to exercise these
powers, it is because either they have voluntarily placed a disability
on that exercise, perhaps in the form of a domestic constitutional
limitation, or they have not considered it necessary, as a practical
matter, to exercise their powers. With this as a starting point for
an analysis of domestic penal legislation, one should first examine
the doctrine of jurisdiction in international law, then consider the
constitution of the forum state to determine if any disability is
placed on the exercise of powers which are acceptable in international law, and finally inspect the specific criminal statute to de-
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termine whether the legislature apparently wished it to have extraterritorial application.

A. Criminal Jurisdiction in International Law
International law incorporates several bases of jurisdiction for
criminal legislation, in the sense that the fact of the legislation itself
or of a prosecution of an individual under it gives no right to another nation to enter a valid objection or to obtain redress.
I. The Territorial Principle. A nation has the right to proscribe
any conduct taking place within its borders as criminal,9 whether
committed by a citizen, resident alien, or nonresident alien.
2. The "Floating Territory" Principle. A ship or aircraft under
the flag of, or perhaps under the substantial private ownership of
nationals of, a nation is within the reach of domestic legislative
power.10 Although the logic of the concept of "floating territory"
may not be ovenvhelming, the doctrine can be supported "on the
pragmatic basis that there must be some law on shipboard, that it
cannot change at every change of waters, and no experience shows
a better rule than that of the state that owns [the vessel]." 11 Because
invocations of this principle are in fact extraterritorial, conflicts of
jurisdiction can arise.
3. The Protected Interest Principle. A state can punish actions
committed beyond its limits or not on board its vessels or aircraft
if they impair an interest which it desires to protect. Although some
question exists with respect to whether nonresident aliens can be
penalized under this kind of criminal legislation,12 the problem
cases primarily involve treason13 and efforts to extend domestic regulation of the economy, such as antitrust laws, to activities or agreements in foreign countries undertaken in full compliance with the
law of those countries.14 If the conduct in question is forbidden by
·both countries, the application of forum law to such acts committed
9. See HARVARD R.E5EARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, JURISDICTION WITH REsPEcr' TO
CRIME, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPP. 480-508 (1935) (hereinafter cited as HARVARD REsEARcH];
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 146-58 (Mueller & Wise ed. 1965); REsTATEMENT (SECOND)
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 17 (1965) [hereinafter cited as REsTATEMENT].
10. See HARVARD R.EsEARcH 508-19; REsTATEMENT §§ 28-29, 31-32.
11. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 585 (1953).
•
12. See Cook, The Application of the Criminal Law of a Country to Acts Committed
by Foreigners Outside the Jurisdiction, 40 W. VA. L.Q. 303 (1934); Garcia-Mora,

Criminal Jurisdiction Over Foreigners for Treason and Offenses Against the Safety of
the State Committed Upon Foreign Territory, 19 U. PITT. L. REY. 567 (1958); Woolsey,
Extraterritorial Crimes, 20 AM. J. !NT'L L. 757 (1926).
13. See text accompanying notes 57-60 infra.
14. See REsTATEMENT, Reporter's Note at 68-75 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1958); BISHOP,

CAsEs ON INTERNATIONAL LAw 468-71 (2d ed. 1962).
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elsewhere, even by noncitizens of the forum state, appears unobjectionable.
4. Nationality of the Offender. A country can regulate the conduct of its own citizens wherever they may be.15 No other nation
can immunize them, unless they expatriate themselves, except perhaps in the case of dual nationality.16
5. Nationality of the Victim. Many states assert jurisdiction because the victim of a criminal act committed outside its boundaries
is one of its citizens. The propriety of asserting this as a basis of
criminal jurisdiction was before the Permanent Court of International Justice in The Lotus Case, 17 but the decision approving exercise of jurisdiction was rested on other grounds. 18
6. The "Universality" Principle. Piracy is historically the oldest
application of the idea that some acts are so evil that the offender
must be punished as quickly as possible. Thus, any country which
captures the offender can and should exact retribution, at least if
no other country having a better or more direct basis for asserting
jurisdiction is willing to do so. 19
It is therefore evident that under international law a state is
far from powerless to extend the coverage of its laws to activities
which took place, in whole or in part, beyond its borders.

B. Availability of International Law Principles
to the Federal Government
The second point of inquiry in deciding whether domestic legislation can have extraterritorial effect is whether the local constitution has placed any disability on the exercise of powers othenvise
inherent in sovereignty. In most countries this is not a matter of
much concern, for generally no special limitations are placed on
the content of laws, as contrasted with the procedures for lawmaking. 20 But the American federal system poses a special problem,
since it rests on the theoretical premise that the federal government,
and in particular Congress, can act only when the power to do so
15. HARVARD REsEARCH 519-39; REsrATEMENT § 30; cf, HARVARD REsEARCH 539-42.
16. Cf. Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952); Coumas v. Superior Court,
31 Cal. 2d 682, 192 P .2d 449 (1948).
17. Permanent Court of International Justice (1927), P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No, 9, 2 HuosoN, WORLD COURT REPORTS 20 (1935).
18. See generally HARVARD REsEARCH 509-10, 518, 578-79.
19. HARVARD REsEARCH 563-72; REsrATEMENT § 34. Other broader applications of
this principle are discussed in HARVARD REsEARcH 573-92.
20. See, e.g., JAPAN CONST. art. 41: "The Diet shall be the highest organ of state
power, and shall be the sole law-making organ of the State."
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is specifically delegated to it in the Constitution, while the nondelegated attributes of sovereignty remain with the states and with
the people.21 A primary issue, therefore, is the degree to 'which the
power to legislate extraterritorially can be viewed as being properly
in the hands of Congress.
There is, of course, no direct delegation to Congress of power
to make a comprehensive criminal code. Nevertheless, there are at
least two bases for sweeping congressional invocation of most, if
not all, of the jurisdictional concepts approved in international law.
One basis, which rests chiefly on Mr. Justice Sutherland's opinion
in United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp.,22 is that the powers
of sovereignty which England exercised in her American colonies
immediately vested in all the colonies collectively upon separation, so that the United States, as successor to the colonies as
a group, can do everything which Great Britain or any other nation
could in its international relations. Under the "necessary and
proper" clause,23 therefore, Congress should be able to create penal
legislation having extraterritorial application if the external relations or internal interests of the United States so dictate. However,
this basis for asserting federal jurisdiction has been criticized as
historically inaccurate,24 and might have an unfortunate impact on
state legislative power if it were made the sole basis for federal external legislation, a matter to be discussed below.25
The second basis, therefore, is perhaps a more satisfactory one:
federal governmental powers must all rest on the Constitution and
not on any overriding concept of inherent sovereignty. However,
broad powers are delegated to Congress by the Constitution, including the laying and collecting of taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; 26
the regulation of foreign commerce; 21 the establishment of a uniform rule of naturalization; 28 the punishment of counterfeiting of
money and securities of the United States; 29 the establishment of
post offices; 30 the creation of patent and copyright law; 31 and the
21. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
22. 299 U.S. 304, 316-18 (1936).
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
24. See Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946).
25. See text following note 37 infra.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6.
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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definition and punishment of piracies and felonies committed on
the high seas and offenses against the law of nations.~2 Moreover,
Congress can make all laws "necessary and proper" to execute these
more specific grants of power,83 including laws having extraterritorial effect when Congress thinks it appropriate. Thus, the question
in a particular case becomes one of whether Congress did in fact
intend the legislation to have extraterritorial effect, and not whether
it has the power to legislate extraterritorially. Part II below describes
what Congress has done to date to exercise its power, whether it
be viewed as inherent or delegated, to legislate extraterritorially.
C. Availability of International Law Principles to the States

Perhaps a more important question is whether the states can
legislate other than on the territorial principle.84 The obverse of
the principle that the federal government is one of delegated powers
is that powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
or prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states or to the
people.85 Thus, at this point it is important to determine what theory
is used to explain federal exercise of power to legislate extraterritorially.
If, as Mr. Justice Sutherland maintained,86 the sovereign powers
of Great Britain vested in the national government and not in the
individual colonies, the exercise of inherent legislative powers affecting external matters would not be available to the states as one
of the attributes of sovereignty.87 The power to legislate extraterritorially, therefore, was not originally in the states to be delegated
to the federal government, and that power does not currently reside in them unless it has been delegated by federal authority. How32. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
33. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
34. See generally Berge, Criminal f urisdiction and the Territorial Principle, 80
MICH. L. REv. 238 (1931); Cook, supra note 12; Levitt, Jurisdiction Over Crimes, 16
J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 316, 495 (1925); Rotenberg, Extraterritorial Legislative Jurisdiction and the S_tate Criminal Law, 38 TEX. L. REv 763 (1960); Wharton, Extraterritorial Crime, 4 SOUTHERN L. REv. (N.S.) 676 (1878).
35. U.S. CoNsr. amend. X.
36. See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
37. On occasion state courts have rested their authority to permit or deny certain
procedural acts on their succession to the power exercised by English courts prior
to American independence. See, e.g., Matter of Murphy v. Supreme Court, 294 N.Y.
440, 63 N.E.2d 49 (1945) (change of venue on application of state held not to be within
traditional powers); Daniels v. People, 6 Mich. 381 (1859) (powers of conservator of
peace); Neibling v. Terry, 352 Mo. 396, 177 S.W.2d 502 (1944) (availability of nolo
contendere). In State ex rel. Griffin v. Smith, 363 Mo. 1235, 258 S.W.2d 590 (1953), the
prosecuting attorney was held to have succeeded to the powers of the English Attorney•
General to enter pleas of nolle prosequi. The same argument is probably applicable
to legislative powers.
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ever, this theory might have a crippling effect on the modernization of state penal legislation, since it excludes any claim to powers
attributed to sovereign states in international law.
·
On the other hand, if the second basis for federal extraterritorial legislation--constitutional delegation-is utilized, the inherent power of the states to enact like legislation is confirmed. Each
state, possessing the powers inherent in sovereignty, can regulate
conduct occurring outside its boundaries so long as (1) there is no
conflict with the paramount power of the federal government to
regulate foreign relations,38 (2) the state legislation does not touch
on a subject which Congress has already pre-empted in the exercise
of its delegated powers,39 and (3) there is no impermissible conflict
with the legislative policies of another state in which the conduct
occurred.40 Except when one or more of these constitutional problems exist, 41 the question once more is one of whether the state
actually intended to legislate extraterritorially, and not whether it
has the power to do so.

II.

EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATIONS OF FEDERAL

LA.w

How far has Congress in fact invoked its power to legislate extraterritorially? The most commonly used basis for federal criminal
jurisdiction is of course the territorial principle. However, there is
some uncertainty regarding the proper scope of this principle. For
example, subject to certain requirements of general condemnation
of the activity in question and of substantiality, directness, and foreseeability, the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law includes within
the territorial principle those instances in which activity outside
the country "causes an effect within its territory." 42 The explanatory
comment suggests that both physical and economic effects are within
the application of this principle. The Restatement, however, has a
separate provision which purports to define the protective principle
as "attaching legal consequences to conduct outside [a nation's]
territory that threatens its security as a state,"43 including "the
counterfeiting of the state's seals and currency, false statements to
its diplomatic and consular officials and the falsification of its public
records."44 Such a delineation corresponds quite closely to the Draft
38. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, 3; art. II, § 2, cl. 2,
39. Cf. Hunt, Federal Supremacy and State Anti-Subversive Legislation, 53
L. REV. 407 (1955); 55 COLUM, L. R.Ev. 83 (1955).
40. See text accompanying notes 125-29 infra,
41. See part V infra.

42.

§

18.

43. § 33.

44. Ibid.

MICH,
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Convention on Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime.45 This approach
seems to reflect a definition of "interest" as something in which a
government itself is directly interested, particularly in its relationships to other governments as governments, and therefore a perfectly
proper concern for international law.
The foregoing definition, however, creates difficulty if it is used
as a basis for viewing domestic legislation for purposes of local
criminal law administration. The state through its legislation protects a number of interests, including those of the person, of property, of reputation, and of the government itself.46 Thus, from the
standpoint of criminal law, a more useful standard for classification
might well be devised. The applicable standard should rest on
whether there has taken place within the geographical limits of the
forum an observable act or event which, without further activity
by the primary actor, produces identifiable harm, or whether the
identifiable harm is the result of completed activity by tl?,e offender
in some other geographical and sovereign area, followed by and
coupled with the independent activity of other persons. Under this
test, a fatal shot fired from either inside or outside the forum jurisdiction is still within the territorial principle; the latter would also
encompass a fraudulent statement, whether made orally in the
presence of the victim or communic.ated to him by means of telephone, telegraph, or broadcast from another state or country. On
the other hand, a false claim submitted to an overseas branch of a
local bank or to a governmental disbursing agent abroad, or a perjured statement made to a consul in an application for a passport
or visa, produces only an indirect result in the forum jurisdiction.
Covering transfers of funds are made and visas or entry permits are
authorized or issued by others than the persons with whom the
offender has dealt, though of course the result is one which the government has a legitimate interest in repressing. A distinction like
this based on "direct harm" as contrasted with "indirect harm"
might in the long run be an easier test to administer than the Harvard Research and Restatement formulations, since it focuses attention on the harm which the legislature intended to prevent.
If the interest sought to be protected can be impaired only by a
direct physical act occurring within the geographical limits of the
state, the principle invoked would be the territorial principle. If,
however, the interest may also be impaired by activity occurring
elsewhere, punishment for extraterritorial acts would be based on
45. Arts. 3, 7, 8. See HARVARD REsEARCH 439-40.
46. See Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARv. L. REv. I (1943).
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the protective principle. Irrespective of the labels that may be applied, the issue probably turns o:ri whether the basic dispute involves
relationships between governments as such or the interpretation of
local legislation in the course of litigation in forum courts. An acceptable basis of classification for one type of dispute need not necessarily be applied to the other.
It is clear that federal legislation has been applied to cover activities done primarily outside our borders. Sometimes this is accomplished by invoking the doctrine of conspiracy and finding at
least one overt act by one of the conspirators done within the United
States. 47 The primary conduct of the other conspirators is then considered to be within the ambit of federal law even though they may
be citizens of other countries who never entered the United States
during the course of the conspiracy. At other times judicial power
is based on the vicarious responsibility of a principal for acts of his
agent or of an accomplice for the conduct of the primary actor. 48
In prosecutions for mail fraud or the conduct of a lottery, jurisdiction may be asserted on the basis of mailing materials or broadcasting information from another country to the United States.49
In other instances conduct committed abroad is penalized because
it is directed against United States governmental agencies. Thus,
United States citizens have been convicted for false claims made to,
and payments received from, governmental officials abroad, 50 and
aliens have been convicted of perjury51 and deported52 for false
claims made under oath to American consular authorities in other
countries. A primary matter of current concern is the application
of American economic legislation to American companies and foreign companies licensed to do business in the United States on the
basis of acts done outside the United States.53 This extraterritorial
47. Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927); Ramey v. United States, 230 F.2d
171 (5th Cir. 1956); Horwitz v. United States, 63 F.2d 706 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 289
U.S. 760 (1933).
48. Claremont v. United States, 26 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1928).
49. See Kaufman v. United States, 163 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333
U.S. 857 (1948); Horwitz v. United States, 63 F.2d 706 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 289 U.S.
760 (1933).
50. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922); cf. Hatfield v. Guay, 87 F.2d 358
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 678 (1937) (extradition granted to Canada for Canadian
citizen who made fraudulent representations to Canadian and British authorities
in Florida and Massachusetts).
51. Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961),
affirming United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Cal. 1960), noted in 13
STAN. L. REv. 155 (1960); cf. Chin Bick Wah v. United States, 245 F.2d 274 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 870 (1957). Contra, United States v. Baker, 136 F. Supp. 546
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).
52. United States ex rel. Majka v. Palmer, 67 F.2d 146 (7th Cir. 1933).
53. See Matter of Grand Jury Investigation of the Shipping Industry, 186 F. Supp.
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application of economic legislation will be discussed further in
Part V.
Federal legislation expressly covers the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the United States.54 Under these acts, there have
been a number of applications of the "floating territory" principle
to United States flag vessels, including incidents occurring within
the territorial waters of other countries.55
There is no federal legislation based as obviously on the nationality principle as, for example, the German Penal Code or the
Japanese Draft Penal Code.56 However, citizens can clearly be subjected to federal legislation that is expressly applicable to activity
done outside this country. The treason cases are obvious examples,
and one Supreme Court decision directly upheld the power of Congress to compel compliance with American law by citizens living
abroad. 57 The implication of the treason cases, particularly Kawakita
v. United States, 58 is that treason can be committed only by one who
is a citizen; American cases do not go as far in finding a nexus to the
prosecuting power as certain decisions in Englandt>0 and South
Africa. 60 Accordingly, treason as defined by American courts is more
closely aligned with the concept of jurisdiction based on nationality
of the offender than it is ·with the protected interest principle.
There is one problem area in which clear recognition of the
nationality principle as a basis for criminal legislation is needed:
criminal acts committed abroad by dependents of United States
military personnel stationed overseas and by civilian employees in
298 (D.D.C. 1960); United States v. R. P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Cal.
1957); authorities cited note 14 supra.
54. 18 u.s.c. § 7 (1964).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933).
56. GERMAN PENAL CODE § 4; JAPANESE DRAFT PENAL CODE arts. 4, 5.
57. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932). Concerning the power to enjoin
an American from infringing a trademark through acts done abroad, see Steele v.
Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
58. 343 U.S. 717 (1952). See also Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir,
1950); Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
918 (1949).
59. See Joyce v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1946] A.C. 347. Jurisdiction was
based on the fact that Joyce, an American citizen who collaborated with the Nazis in
Germany, held a fraudulently-obtained British passport which he had not surrendered
and which had not expired at the time of the acts upon which the treason charge was
based.
60. See Rex v. Neumann, [1949] 3 S. AFR. L.R. 1238. A German national was held
to be within the coverage of South African treason law on the grounds that he had
resided in South Africa until 1940, was married to a South African subject, had enlisted
in South African forces, and had left for combat service during which he was captured.
His subsequent service in the German army was legally treason unless, as a German
citizen, he was compelled to do the acts charged against him, a matter left to the
proofs.

February 1966]

Penal Legislation: Extraterritoriality

621

like situations. The United States Supreme Court has denied the
constitutional power of courts-martial to try such individuals for
their crimes. 61 As a result, if they are to be tried at all, they must
be tried in the courts of the country in which their criminal acts
occurred. If this is considered undesirable, then Congress should
enact a criminal code applicable to dependents and civilian employees stationed abroad and provide for trial in the United States
under the usual venue rule. 62 The nationality principle offers sufficient support for this legislation that no international law problems
should follow its enactment.
There is nothing in present fed<:ral law which appears to provide for jurisdjction based on the United States citizenship or the
official status (such as a consular employee) of an injured person. 63
However, it seems probable that the absence of such legislation is
based upon the lack of exercise of power, not lack of power itself.
Piracy is, of course, punished by domestic law,64 and United
States participation in war crimes proceedings in Europe and the
Far East suggests acceptance of the power to act in this area on the
basis of the universality principle. 65 However, there is no other legislation based directly on the universality concept.66

III.

EXTRATERRITORIAL .APPLICATION OF STATE LAW

On the basis of the foregoing discussion it is evident that there
is no support in fact for any assertion that Congress can or does
apply only the territorial principle. Are the states more restricted
than the federal government in this respect?
If the matter were judged exclusively on the basis of selected
statements in state appellate court decisions over the years, it might
be concluded that only the territorial principle may be invoked by
the states and that legislation which purports to apply to activity
61. See McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960) (employee,
noncapital case); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960) (employee, capital case); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 36J U.S. 234 (1960) (dependent, noncapital
case); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (dependent, capital case). See also Warren, The
Bill of Rights and the Military, in THE GREAT RIGHTS 87 (Cahn ed. 1963),
62. 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (1964). See text accompanying notes 103-06 infra.
63. See 2 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 179-80 (1941) [hereinafter
cited as HACKWORTII]. A few provisions of the United States Criminal Code, e.g., 18
U.S.C. § 1114 (1964) (murder of specified federal officials), might apply to acts committed abroad, but there is no case law on the point.
64. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1651-61 (1964), authorized by U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
65. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1
(1946).
66, Examples of foreign statutes based on this principle are gathered in HARVARD
R.F.5EARCH 573-78.
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done outside the state is unconstitutional. In fact, however, statements by the United States Supreme Court which touch on the
problem assume that state laws can have extraterritorial application
without contravening the federal constitution, 67 and there is very
little state authority actually holding statutes with external application to be unconstitutional. The chief impact of the above mentioned
remarks in state court opinions, almost all dicta, is that state appellate judges at times interpret the coverage of penal legislation more
narrowly than they would if they were trained in another tradition. 68
However, it is clear that, by means of one theoretical device or another, American state courts have penalized conduct which for all
important purposes took place beyond the states' boundaries.
One method the state courts have used is to invoke the territorial
principle whenever any act pertaining to the criminal transaction
occurs or takes effect within the forum state, even though in fact
the major activity took place elsewhere. There are several commonlaw illustrations of this:
I. If an injury is inflicted through force set in motion from outside the state by one who was never physically present within the
state, the situs (or a situs) of the assault or resulting homicide is in
the state in which the force took effect.69
2. If a wound is inflicted outside the forum state, but the victim
later dies in the state, it is considered to be murder or manslaughter
in the state in which the death occurs, as well as in the state or
country in which the wound was given. 70 This approach purports to
be a redefinition of homicide law, but its primary effect is to create
jurisdiction where none would otherwise lie under the commonlaw concept that the place of homicide is where the blow was given.
3. By means of a legal fiction, common-law larceny, and perhaps
related crimes like embezzlement or obtaining property by false
pretenses, is deemed a continuing offense. Thus, if the thief transports the property into the forum state from another state he is
still "taking and carrying away with intent to deprive permanently,"
and thus commits a fresh crime of larceny in the state into or through
which he goes.71 This theory rests on a false analogy between the
67. See Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941); Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280
(1911).
68. Rotenberg, supra note 34, at 767-70, 773-80.
69. State v. Hall, 114 N.C. 909, 19 S.E. 602 (1894).
70. See Simpson v. State, 92 Ga. 41, 17 S.E. 984 (1893); Commonwealth v. Macloon,
101 Mass. 1 (1869); People v. Tyler, 7 Mich. 160 (1859); State v. Justus, 65 N.M. 195,
334 P .2d 1104 (1959). This concept is also embodied in several state statutes, See, e.g.,
MISS. CoDE ANN. § 2430 (1956); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2931.20 (Page 1953).
71. See People v. McGowan, 127 Cal. App. 39, 14 P.2d 1036 (1932); State v. Pam•
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English counties and the American states and serves primarily to
create an alternative penalty for possessing stolen property, but is
well established in state law.
4. Under conspiracy doctrine, the forum state has jurisdiction
over all conspirators involved in a conspiracy and all criminal acts
committed in furtherance of it if any overt act is committed within
its bounds by any of the conspirators.72 This theory of jurisdiction
for conspiracy cases parallels the doctrine which is applied in federal
practice. 73 It creates, however, a greater likelihood of multiple prosecutions for the same transaction than does the federal doctrine, because if two or more states move against the same conspirators, a
conviction in one state cannot be pleaded in bar to prosecutions
in the others. In conspiracy cases before federal courts, the federal
question is usually one of venue £qr fixing the place of the trial;
one trial exhausts the power of the federal government to proceed.
5. Under doctrines of complicity, an accessory who has been at
all significant times within the forum state is vicariously responsible
for the criminal acts of the principal offender, even though the latter
has never been within that state and has committed his criJJ?-inal
acts elsewhere.74
There are also clear instances in which concepts other than the
expanded territorial principle are embodied in state legislation. In
at least one situation, that of nonsupport of wife or child by a husband or parent, the basis utilized appears to be the nationality
(residence) of the defendant or the victim, though the language
used is that of "status." The duty of support is considered to follow
the dependent, so that if no support is forthcoming the husband
or parent can be convicted· even though he has never been in the
forum state.75 At least one state also penalizes the resident husband
bianchi, 139 Conn. 543, 95 A.2d 695 (1953); Newlon v. Bennett, 253 Iowa 555, 112
N.W.2d 884 (1962). The English precedent is summarized in .ARCHBOLD, PLEADING, Evx•
DENCE AND PRAcrICE IN CRIMINAL CASES 43 (33d ed. 1954) [hereinafter cited as ARCH- .
BOLD]. Statutes commonly restate this rule. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE§ 789; MICH. COMP,
LAws §§ 767.64•.66 (1948); MISS. CoDE ANN. § 2431 (1956); Mo. REv. STAT. § 541.040
(1959); N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1930(2); Omo R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 2931.22 (Page 1953); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-107 (1955).
72. State v. Trumbull, 24 Conn. Supp. 129, 187 A.2d 445 (Conn. App. 1962); People
v. Perry, 23 Ill. 2d 147, 177 N.E.2d 323 (1961); State ex rel. Gildar v. Kriss, 191 Md. 568,
62 A.2d 568 (1948); People v. Glubo, 5 App. Div. 2d 527, 174 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1958);
State v. Goldberg, 261 N.C. 181, 134 S.E.2d 334 (1964).
73. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
74. See cases cited note 72 supra, and restatements of the do.ctrine in CAL. PEN.
CoDE §§ 27(3), 778b; IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-203 (Burns 1956); N.Y. PEN. LAw § 1930(3);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-102 (1955).
75. State v. Tickle, 238 N.C. 206, 77 S.E.2d 632 (1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 938
(1954); State v. Collins, 235 S.C. 65, 110 S.E.2d 270, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 895 (1959);
Osborn v. Harris, 115 Utah 204, 203 P.2d 917 (1949); State v. Jackson, 145 W. Va. 51,
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or father for nonsupport even if the wife or child has been continuously in another state or country, on the theory that it has the power
to regulate the conduct of its own residents affecting residents of
other states. 76
Some states have tried to reach interstate or international crim•
inal transactions by special statutes. One type of statute penalizes
persons who commence the commission of a crime outside the forum
state but bring about its consummation within that state through
either their own acts or the acts of an accomplice or innocent agent. 77
On occasion, the same result is reached even without a special statute. 78 The concept of consummation is such, however, that the
impact of the criminal activity done elsewhere on some interest
which the forum state desires to protect must be quite apparent.10
Indirect economic loss may not be enough. 80
A second form of statute, probably intended by legislatures to
be the exact reverse of the first, punishes one who with intent to
commit a crime does an act within the forum state in execution
or part execution of that intent and succeeds in committing a crime
in another state or country. 81 These statutes have generally received
particularly narrow construction by courts oriented strongly in
favor of the territorial principle. The two principal jurisdictions
having this type of legislation have required that enough be done
within the state to constitute an attempt.82 Thus, acts of "mere
112 S.E.2d 452 (1960). Extradition may also be allowed even though the person extra•
dited has never been in the forum state. Squadroni v. Smith, 349 S.W.2d 700 (Ky. App.
1961). Cf. Commonwealth v. Lanoue, 326 Mass. 559, 95 N.E.2d 925 (1950), in which the
charge was "begetting and abandoning"; conception occurred in another state and the
begetting statute therefore did not apply. Bigamy jurisdiction turns on the place of
a second marriage, Green v. State, 232 Ind. 596, 115 N.E.2d 211 (1953); State v. Jones,
227 N.C. 94, 40 S.E.2d 700 (1946), so that bigamous cohabitation in the forum state
does not give the latter power to prosecute unless the second marriage also took place
there or there is a special bigamous-cohabitation statute.
76. State v. Echavarria, 101 N.H. 458, 146 A.2d 256 (1958). However, in reliance on
the territorial principle, New Hampshire will not extradite its own citizens for non•
support. See Hardy v. Betz, 105 N.H. 169, 195 A.2d 582 (1963).
77. See the statutes cited note 74 supra; N.Y. PEN, LAw § 1933.
78. See Medley v. Warden of Maryland House of Correction, 210 Md. 649, 123 A.2d
595 (1956); Commonwealth v. Welch, 345 Mass. 366, 187 N.E.2d 813 (1963).
79. Mortensen v. State, 214 Ark, 528, 217 S.W.2d 325 (1949); People v. Leonard,
24 Misc. 2d 300, 197 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Gen. Sess. 1960).
80. People v. Werblow, 241 N.Y. 55, 148 N.E. 786 (1925). But see People v. Mason,
184 Cal. App. 2d 317, 7 Cal. Rptr. 627 (1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 904 (1961); State
v. Trumbtill, 24 Conn. Supp. 129, 187 A.2d 445 '(Conn. App. 1962); People v. National
Radio Distributors Corp., 9 Misc. 2d 824, 168 N.Y.S.2d 886 (County Ct. Bronx County
1957). In the latter cases the economic impact was largely indirect.
81. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 27(1), 778a; IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-216 (Burns 1956); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 2428 (1956); N.Y. PEN. LAw § 1930(1); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2931.21 (Page
1953) (homicide only); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-103 (1955).
82. See People v. Buffum, 40 Cal. 2d 709, 256 P.2d 317 (1953); People v. Werblow,
241 N.Y. 55, 148 N.E. 786 (1925); cf. People v. Zayas, 217 N.Y. 78, 111 N.E. 465 (1916).
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preparation" are not prosecuted, even though they are effective to
bring about the commission of a crime somewhere else.
The California Supreme Court has gone even further by its
decision in People v. Buffum88 that the crime of conspiracy cannot be committed if the contemplated activity is to be completed
outside the state. Despite statutory language broad enough to permit
jurisdiction to be based on a portion of a criminal transaction not
itself sufficient to amount to an attempt under traditional law, 84
the Buffum decision exempted from the coverage of California
criminal law persons who transported pregnant women from their
homes in California to Tijuana, Mexico, where they were criminally
aborted. The court's premises that enough had to be done in
California to amount to an attempt (.transportation alone obviously
is not enough to constitute attempted abortion) and that conspiracy
would not lie if the sole objective of the agreement was a violation
of Mexican law, succeeded only in creating a haven for criminals
whose acts chiefly circumvented the public policy embodied in the
California Penal Code85 that abortions should not be freely available. This is particularly evident in light of the fact that the extradition treaty with Mexico86 does not list abortion as an extraditable
offense.
The court's theory would be almost equally obnoxious, however,
if extradition were available, just as it would be if the abortions
had been performed in Nevada instead of Mexico. Nevada authorities might content themselves with prosecuting the one person who
in fact performed the abortions; they might not bother to prosecute
the members of the. ring in California, particularly when all the
evidence establishing complicity and· solicitation of customers is
within California and not readily accessible to Nevada courts. Later
California decisions carefully distinguish the Buffum case and its
rationale,87 but it nevertheless stands as an excellent example of the
83. 40 Cal. 2d 709, 256 P.2d 317 (1953).
84. CAL. P.EN. CODE § 27: "The following persons are liable to punishment under
the laws of this state: I. All persons who commit, in whole or in part, any crime within
this state •••." CAL. P.EN. CODE § 778a: "Whenever a person, with intent to commit a
crime, does any act within this state in execution or part execution of such intent;
which culminates in the commission of a crime, either within or without this state
such person is punishable for such crime in this state in the same manner as if the
same had been committed entirely within this state."
85. CAL. PEN. CODE § 274.
86. Treaty of Feb. 22, 1899, 31 Stat. 1818, 55 Stat. 1133, T .S. No. 421.
87. In People v. Burt, 45 Cal. 2d 3U, 288 P.2d 503 (1955), the court held that
Buffum does not apply to a charge of solicitation to commit extortion in Mexico, since
extortion is specified in the solicitation statute. The court noted that any crime could
be the objective of a conspiracy, but that solicitation refers only to serious crimes, "all
of which are felonies under the law of this state and at common law and are crimes
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triumph of the rote of the territorial principle over the pragmatic
needs of law enforcement.
The unsatisfactory nature of judicially-created law in this area,
and the restrictive interpretation of special "in whole or in part"
statutes, have provided strong incentive for a modernization of the
law. The impetus for this reform movement is also based on the
ever-increasing frequency of criminal acts and transactions which
transcend artificial, historical boundaries between states.
The American Law Institute Model Penal Code endeavors to
provide a comprehensive treatment of the many problems of jurisdiction which have arisen over the years. 88 In section 1.03(l)(a) it
restates the basic premise that a person may be convicted of an
offense which he himself commits or which is committed by someone for whose acts he is legally accountable if "either the conduct
which is an element of the offense or the result which is such an
element occurs within [the forum state]." As an illustration, if a
person makes false statements in a long-distance telephone conversation from Ohio to Michigan and induces a Michigan resident to
send a sum of money by mail to Ohio, Michigan could maintain a
prosecution for obtaining money by false pretenses, 80 even though
the defendant had never been physically present in Michigan until
after his extradition.
Beyond this, however, there is power to prosecute if "conduct
occurring outside the State is sufficient under the law of [the forum
state] to constitute an attempt to commit an offense within the
State." 90 This provision is intended to permit prosecution of one
who endeavors but fails to achieve a result which is criminal under
the law of the forum state. It would cover, for example, the person
in the above illustration who tried to obtain money from the Michigan resident by false statements made over the telephone, even
though the latter had second thoughts and decided not to send the
money after all. It would also include one who sends an explosive
"booby-trap" package by mail, only to have it intercepted at either
the dispatching or receiving post office. The time or place of the
frustration or interception would not determine criminality.01
under the law of all civilized nations." Id. at 317, 288 P.2d at 505. In People v. Jones,
39 Cal. Rptr. 302, 228 Cal. App. 2d 74 (1964), the court upheld a conviction of conspiracy to operate a lottery in Nevada on the grounds that CAL. PEN. CODE § 319 penalizes the setting up of lottery schemes and that § 320 penalizes setting up as well as
drawing, so that the conduct was substantially within California's borders.
88.
89.
90.
91.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 (P.O.D. 1962).
MICH. COMP. LAws § 750.218 (1948).
MODEL PENAL CODE § l.03(l)(b) (P.O.D. 1962).
ALI PROCEEDINGS (33d Annual Meeting) 112-16 (1956).
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A state is also authorized to prosecute if "conduct occurring outside the State is sufficient under the law of [the forum state] to
constitute a conspiracy to commit an offense within the State and
an overt act in furtherance of such conspiracy occurs within the
State. " 92 This provision restates the common-law doctrines already
summarized.98 The Institute specifically repudiated the rule of the
Buffum case94 by permitting a prosecution if "conduct occurring
within the State establishes complicity in the commission of, or an
attempt, solicitation or conspiracy to commit, an offense in another
jurisdiction which also is an offense under the law of [the forum
state]. " 95
The Model Penal Code, however, goes beyond common-law tradition to permit a state to invoke either the protected interest or
the nationality principle, by permitting exercise of jurisdiction if:
the offense consists of the omission to perform a legal duty imposed by the law of [the forum state] with respect to domicile,
residence or a relationship to a person, thing or transaction in
the State ... [or if] the offense is based on a statute of [the
forum state] which expressly prohibits conduct outside the
State, when the conduct bears a reasonable relation to a legitimate interest of this State and the actor knows or should know
that his conduct is likely to affect that interest.96
These two bases of jurisdiction are certa!nly an encouragement to
courts to consider specific penal legislation in terms of the purposes
underlying it in order to decide whether acts done entirely outside
the forum state may nonetheless impair an interest which the forum
legislature desires to protect.
There are two doubtful aspects about the language itself, however. One problem is the limitation that the conduct must bear "a
reasonable relation to a legitimate interest" of the prosecuting state.
This statutory language permits, and indeed invites, a court to decide that legislation touching conduct outside the state is unwise
even though it is constitutional. The record of judicial hostility
toward legislation is substantial enough that the judiciary should
not be given this sort of veto power over legislative judgment. A
phrase like "the conduct affects a legislatively-protected interest of
or within the State" would be much preferable to the present language.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

MODEL PENAL CODE § l.03(l)(c) (P.O.D. 1962).
See text accompanying notes 69-70 supra.
Discussed in text accompanying notes 80-84 supra.
MODEL PENAL CODE§ l.03(l)(d) (P.O.D. 1962).
§ l.03(l)(e)•(f).
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The second problem is the effect of the phrase "should know"
as an alternative to actual knowledge that the actor's conduct is
likely to affect an interest protected by legislation of the forum
state. This approach appears to permit a finding of criminality on
the basis of negligence,97 even though the primary statute under
which the prosecution is br<?ught specifies a certain intent or motive.
It is highly questionable whether one who acted wholly outside
the forum state should be held criminally responsible because he
"should have known" that his conduct would affect an interest of
the state when the state would have to prove specific intent if the
same act had been done within its borders.
The Code makes some effort to reduce "conflict of laws" problems by exempting from the coverage of section l.03(I)(a) an act
which is intended to take place in another jurisdiction where it
would not· be criminal, unless either the forum legislature evidences
a plain purpose to make the conduct criminal wherever it occurs08
or the actor purposely or knowingly caused that result within the
forum state.99 Of course, neither exception applies if the conduct or
result is also criminal in the place where the conduct occurred or
where the results might otherwise have been achieved.
The Model Penal Code has not yet been enacted as such in any
state. However, three recent statutes accomplish somewhat similar
results. A Wisconsin statt1.te100 permits prosecution if any of the
constituent elements of a crime occurs in Wisconsin or if a person
outside Wisconsin does an act with the intent to cause a consequence
prohibited by some Wisconsin criminal statute. A Minnesota statute101 includes an "in whole or in part" clause and a provision covering one who, from outside Minnesota, "intentionally causes a result
within the state prohibited by the criminal laws" of Minnesota.
The Illinois Criminal Code treats an offense as partly committed
within that state "if either the conduct which is an element of the
offense, or the result which is such an element, occurs within the
State."102 This language should encourage the courts to focus their
attention less on the territorial principle as such, and more on the
interests sought to be protected by legislation and the degree to
which these intere~ts can be infringed by activity taking place beyond
the boundaries of the forum .state.
97. Cf. the Model Penal Code definition of "negligently" in § 2.02(2)(d).
98. § 1.03(2).
99. § 1.03(3).
100. WIS. STAT, § 939.03 (1961). .
101. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60!>.025 (1964).
102. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § l-5(b) (1963).

February 1966]

IV.

Penal Legislation: Extraterritoriality

629

FIXING THE PLACE OF TRIAL FOR INTER-JURISDICTIONAL CRIME

If legislation is construed to apply to activity outside the forum
state, there still remains the problem of the place of the trial itself.
A court must be found which can constitutionally adjudicate the
case. This, too, is a problem in which the solution under federal law
is fairly clear, but the proper approach under state law is much less
evident.

A. Venue Under Federal Law
The federal constitution expressly contemplates that some
criminal acts can be committed outside the continental United
States and yet be tried in federal courts. Trial of crimes is to be
held "in the state where the said crimes shall have been committed;
but when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such
place or places as the Congress may by law have directed." 103
Congress accordingly provided that the venue for offenses not committed within any state or district would be the district in which the
offender is found or into which he is first brought.104
·
The original form· of the statute did not prove flexible enough,
and the section was extensively revised in 1963. If there are joint
offenders, all may now be tried in any district in which one of them
is found or into which he is brought. If the offender has not yet been
arrested or returned, then an indictment may be returned or information filed in the district of the last known residence of the
offender or of any one of two or more joint offenders; if tlie place of
last residence is unknown, the pleading may be returned or filed
in the District of Columbia.
The joint-offender provision is intended to avoid the inconvenience inherent· in trying joint offenders separately if they are
found in or brought into different districts--the necessary procedure under the original language. The matter relating to indictment is for the purpose of stopping the running of the statute of
limitations. Under the original form of the statute, no federal grand
jury could sit until venue had been determined through the fact
of the arrest or return of the offender. So long as the offender was
at liberty, the statute of limitations continued to run. However, for
purposes of indictment, venue is now fixed by the terms of the
103. U.S. CONST. art. ID, § 2, cl. 3.
104. 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (1964). See United States v. Provoo, 215 F.2d 531 (2d Cir.
1954); Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
918 (1949).
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statute, and the prescriptive statute may be tolled before it expires. 10G
Trial presumably takes place in the district in which the indictment
is returned, as provided by rule 54(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. If any part of a criminal transaction or any
overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy takes place within a federal
district or districts, venue lies there by operation of the basic constitutional requirement of jury trial and the rules governing
venue. 106
B. Venue Under State Law

Determination of the proper place for trial in inter-jurisdictional
crimes is considerably more complicated under state law. State constitutions lack express language equivalent to the federal constitutional provision discussed above. Therefore, the question of where
a crime committed through acts done outside the forum state is to
be tried turns on the construction of the jury-trial provision in the
state's constitution.107 Fourteen states simply guarantee a jury trial
without specifying the place, and seven others have indefinite provisions which can be interpreted to mean the same thing. 108 One
state, Hawaii, refers to a jury of "the district wherein the crime shall
have been committed."109 If this provision was intended to refer to
the entire federal district of Hawaii, it obviously leaves considerable
flexibility in fixing the place of trial. Twelve states provide for a
trial in the "county or district" in which the crime was committed,
and sixteen states require trial by a jury of the "county" or
"parish. " 110
In no state should there be any major problem in finding an
appropriate county in which to try an offense if any act or result
occurs in one or more counties, 111 particularly if the approach sug105. U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 660-63 (1963).
106. Fm. R. CRIM. P. 18. See United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405 (1958); Johnston
v. United States, 351 U.S. 215 (1956); Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912).
107. See Blume, The Place of Trial of Criminal Cases: Constitutional Yicinage and
Venue, 43 MrcH. L. REv. 59 (1944).
108. See Blume, supra note 107, at 79-89. Alaska is within this group. ALASKA
CoNsr. art. I, § 11 (1959).
109. HAWAII CoNsr. art. 1, § 11 (1959).
110. Blume, supra note 107, at 89-92.
111. See Commonwealth v. Welch, 345 Mass. 366, 187 N.E.2d 813 (1963) (venue
where defendant public officer employed, even though offense occurred in Rhode
Island); State v. Tickle, 238 N.C. 206, 77 S.E.2d 632 (1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
938 (1954) (venue in non-support case determined by location of person to whom the
· duty of support is owed); Osborn v. Harris, 115 Utah 204, 203 P.2d 917 (1949) (same).
W. VA. CODE ANN.§ 48-8-6 (1961) provides that venue in non-support cases may also be
based upon the location of the offender when the complaint is filed. See State v.
Jackson, 145 W. Va. 51, 112 S.E.2d 452 (1960). But see Cheshier v. State, 296 P.2d 190
(Okla. Crim. 1956) (prosecution for sale of mortgaged property in county in which
mortgagee lived was improper, since the sale took place in California),
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gested above is used-identification of the interest tq be protected
by the legislation and the nature of its impairment. I{ the act occurs
on or affects persons on board a vessel with a home port in a particular state, or perhaps if the company owning the vessel has a place
of business within the state, this relationship could be sufficient to
fix venue in that state. Jurisdictional power based on an overt act in
furtherance of a conspiracy and jurisdiction over an accomplice
based on the location of the principal's acts are also useful devices
in many cases to identify a proper trial court within the forum state.
The only bases of legislative jurisdiction which create difficulties
are nationality of either the offender or the victim and the universality principle. In twenty-one states it would probably be possible
either to enact something similar to the "first found or first brought"
federal statute,112 or to use the domicile or residence of the offender
or victim if it is located within the state.113 However, in the other
twenty-nine states it might be necessary to amend the state constitution before conduct not having a clearly provable nexus to an identifiable person, office, or place within the forum state could be taken
account of in the courts of that state.

V.

CONFLICT OF JURISDICTION

Once a state or country abandons a strict territorial basis for its
criminal law and asserts its power to act on the basis of a portion of
the criminal transaction only, the flag of its vessels or aircraft, the · ·
nationality of either actor or victim, or the natural-law concepts of
universality, it risks conflict with the interests of, or exercise of jurisdiction by, another government. Although this potential conflict has
occasionally been asserted as a reason for non-exercise of the other
concepts of jurisdiction, it would be more desirable to create special
rules to resolve this conflict, so far as possible, in the best interests
of both governments and of the criminal.

A. Conflicts Between the United States and
Foreign Governments
Conflicts between federal legislation and foreign legislation appear not to pose major problems except in three areas. One possibility
for international conflict relates to treason committed by one holding
112. 18 u.s.c. § 3238 (1964).
113. The author proposed the following language to· the Michigan State Bar Committee to Revise the Criminal Code, to which he is a reporter: "If . . .. a statute
which governs conduct outside the state •.. is violated, trial shall be held in the
county in which the defendant resides, or if he has no fixed residence, in the county
in which he is_ apprehended or to which he is extradited."
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dual nationality. In recent history the question has arisen in the
case of persons of Japanese ancestry who were United States citizens
under the laws of this country and also Japanese subjects under the
relevant Japanese law. The post-World War II cases turned upon
whether the alleged acts of treason were required of the defendants
by physical or legal duress imposed by the Japanese Government, or
were committed voluntarily. 114 It is not entirely clear that a proper
interpretation was given the defendants' situation under Japanese
law of the wartime period, but Japan was in no position to raise the
issue through diplomatic channels at the time of the United States
proceedings. Thus, the cases were handled primarily as a matter of
domestic law.
A second area of conflict is encountered when offenses are committed on board American vessels within the territorial limits of
another country. The United States position is that matters affecting
only a ship's discipline are exclusively within the purview of the law
of the carrier's flag, but that there is concurrent jurisdiction if the
act "involves the peace or dignity of the country, or the tranquillity
of the port."115 To date, disputes over the application of this doctrine
have been settled through diplomatic negotiations.116
The third possibility for conflict is the extent to which economic
activities which occur abroad can be subjected to United States
law on the ground that they affect the American economy. To a
degree the answer to this question depends on whether one is concerned with an American corporation doing business abroad, a foreign subsidiary of an American company which does no business in
the United States, a subsidiary of a foreign corporation which does
business in the United States, or a foreign corporation which does
nothing directly in the United States.
American companies are probably in no position to object to
being called to account in American courts for acts, such as agreements in restraint of trade which affect the American market, committed abroad unless: (I) the act is one required of the American
company by foreign law or (2) the act complained of is actually that
of a foreign state, though for the economic benefit of the American
company.117 The same concept, logically applied, suggests that a
foreign government cannot object if federal law is applied to activi114. See, e.g., Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952).
115. Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1, 11 (1887). See also United States v. Flores, 289
U.S. 137 (1933); United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249 (1893).
116. See 2 HACKWORTH 187-88, 208-23.
117. Compare American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909), with
Ste~le v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952),
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ties in the United States by a wholly-owned or wholly-controlled
corporate subsidiary of a foreign enterprise-activities which are
either permitted or required by the laws of the country in which
the foreign parent enterprise is chartered. Whether it is practically
wise to impose American concepts of monopoly control on the
foreign subsidiary in contradiction of the national traditions of the
country in which the parent enterprise operates is another question,
particularly if a chronic deficit in the balance of payments suggests
the need to attract foreign risk capital. However, grave legal questions appear to underlie any effort to take cognizance of activities by
a foreign corporation in its home country, whether permitted or
required by the laws of that country, for this amounts to a direct
interference with the economic policies of the foreign government.
The practical solution to these problems is probably to be found in
the realm of economic treaties, not forum judicial activity.118
B. Conflict of Laws Involving the States
If there is a conflict benveen a state's exercise of extraterritorial

jurisdi~tion and the interests of a foreign power, the conflict is easily
resolved. Insistence by a state on implementing its policies in the £ace
of specific and legitimate protests by the other nation concerned
amounts to an interference with the foreign relations of the United
States, and thus violates the federal constitution.119 The conflict,
however, must be actual and must be asserted by the toreign government. A potential or hypothetical conflict will not suffice.120
Because of our peculiar state-federal relationship, there is the
possibility of a conflict of jurisdiction between a state and the federal
government in a criminal case. On occasion the conflict can arise
from geographical considerations. In situations where the states have ·
ceded all jurisdictional power over the place where a criminal act is
done so that the land may be used for a federal governmental purpose, as in the case of certain national parks and military reservations,121 or if the federal government has retained all powers over
the tract in question, as in the instance of certain Indian reservations,122 there can be no exercise of state legislative· or judicial jurisdiction concerning the place or the act. If there has been no cession
ll8. On these points, see the materials cited in notes 14 and 53 supra.
119. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, els. I, 3; art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
120. Cf. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
121. See Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19 (1939); United States v. Lovely, 319 F.2d
673 (4th Cir. 1963); People v. Hillman, 246 N.Y. 467, 159 N.E. 400 (1927).
122. See Collifiower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965); In re Carmen, 48
Cal. 2d 851, 313 P .2d 817 (1957); State v. Sanapaw, 21 Wis. 2d 377, 124 N.W.2d 41 (1963).

·634

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 64:609

or reservation, however, jurisdiction is concurrent.123 More often, the
conflict is one of abstract legislative power. If Congress has legislated
under one or more of the powers delegated to it in the Constitution
to reach a problem of general concern, the states are forbidden to
legislate on the same matter. Any state statute purporting to deal
with the problem is unconstitutional. 124
Conflict among the states themselves is also possible. Interstate
conflict has most often been evidenced in the matter of concurrent
control by two or more states of a river or lake which forms part of
their common boundary. In the absence of a special agreement, the
jurisdiction of each state extends to the center of the river channel
or lake. 125 This doctrine, however, can create awkward problems of
law enforcement if the exact location of a crime committed on the
water cannot be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. If neither state
can prove by affirmative evidence that the crime was committed on
its side of the line, the criminal will go free of punishment. Accordingly, Congress has approved various interstate compacts which provide for "concurrent jurisdiction" in each state over the whole body
of water.126
On occasion state legislatures have interpreted the language in
these compacts to mean concurrent legislative jurisdiction, and they
have endeavored to regulate activities--particularly fisheries--on the
part of the river or waters not within their traditional geographic
boundaries. However, these legislative efforts have been struck down
by the courts.127 Using the :fisheries example, State A can regulate all
fishing activities on its half of a river, including those by residents of
State B, its neighbor,128 but the most that A can do to affect activities
on the other part of the stream is to regulate what its own residents
do on the State B side. Thus it seems clear that "concurrent jurisdiction" as used in the many compacts means concurrent judicial jurisdiction when there is identical or substantially identical legislation
in effect in both or all the states affected by the compact.129 Legislative jurisdiction extends to the geographical boundaries of the state,
to the protection of identifiable interests with some sort of locus
123. In re Kelly, 311 Mich. 596, 19 N.W.2d 218 (1945).
124. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956). See also authorities cited note
39 supra.
125. State v. Federanko, 26 N.J. 119, 139 A.2d 30 (1958).
126. The various compacts arc listed by states in COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS,
INTERSTATE COMPACI'S 1783-1956 (1956). See also ZIMMERMAN, THE INTERSTATE CoMPAcr
SINCE 1925, at 9 (1951).
127. See Nielsen v. Oregon, 212 U.S • .315 (1909); State v. Alexander, 222 Ark. 376,
259 S.W.2d 677 (1953).
128. Miller v. McLaughlin, 281 U.S. 261 (1930).
129. See Dutton v. Tawes, 225 Md. 484, 171 A.2d 688 (1961).
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within the state, and to the activities of residents outside the state.
Any other exercise of powers is likely to create a conflict with the
legislative policies of other states which cannot be constitutionally
tolerated.
VI. CONCLUSION
If there were complete freedom to legislate on the matter of the
place of trial of crimes committed outside the geographical limits of
a state, or indeed of crimes committed within the state, there is much
to suggest adoption of the flexible civil-law traditions. Under civil
law, initial placement of the case for trial may be made on the basis
of the location.of the primary criminal act where many of.the witnesses may be, the location of government or corporate records
needed in the case, or the residence of the defendant. If the initial
piacement proves inconvenient, a change can be authorized in the
discretion of the court in which the prosecution is pending or a
higher court. Questions- of mistaken competence must be raised
promptly if they are not to be deemed to have been abandoned. If
a similar system were adopted in American criminal practice, as indeed it has been in our civil practice, the well-established requirement of a constitutionally fair trial would be a sufficient protection to
the defendant against highly inconvenient or prejudicial selection of
venue.180 If additional protection for the defendant were needed, it
could be promoted by abandoning the quite restrictive standards for
change of venue in criminal cases131 and incorporating the forum
non conveniens concept from civil procedure.132
The only barrier to this suggested approach is a continuation of
the verbal tradition that somehow there is a magic significance in
the current practice of drawing a jury from the "vicinage." A fair
jury can be drawn in remote counties; indeed, the current concern
with the impact of publicity on the trial process183 suggests that the
more remote the jurors are from the place of the crime, the less biased
they are likely to be. In fact, the matter of vicinage is a vestige from
the past, when the jury was an active investigative· body which reported to royal authorities about happenings within the locality.184
The jurors' convenience, if not that of royal officials, was served best
by investigations close to home. Though the jury was in time transformed into a supposedly neutral arbiter of fact, the requirement of
130.
131.
132.
133.

Cf. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).

E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 21.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1964); M1cH. GEN. CT. R. 403.
See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Broeder, The Impact of the Vicinage Requirement: An Empirical Look, 45 NEB. L. REv. 99, 106-08, 114-18 (1966).
134. See RADIN, ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HlsTORY 204-12 (1936).

636

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 64:609

vicinage tended to linger on as a purported limitation on the exercise of judicial power long after any very practical reasons for it remained. In England the vicinage limitation has been viewed as a
matter of judicial tradition only, and has been changed by legislation
as occasion demanded. The present Criminal Justice Act of 192513 G
permits proceedings against a person "in any county or place in
which he was apprehended, or is in custody on a charge for the offence, as if the offence had been committed in that county or
place."136 The defendant can plead hardship if trial in that place is
inconvenient to him,137 and the examining justice is empowered to
transfer the case elsewhere for trial if he £eels that such a change
would expedite the trial or save expense.138 Unless an American
state constitution preserves the judicial habits of the past as a matter
of constitutional law, there appears to be no good reason why our
standards for establishing the place of trial cannot evolve as the
English standards have, subject always to the fundamental requirement of fairness in the particular proceeding.
As indicated above,139 however, in a number of states the peculiar
form of the constitutional jury-trial provision makes this sort of
legislative reform difficult if not impossible, thus preserving in
constitutional amber the rote thinking of a day when legislatures and
courts in £act chose to utilize only the territorial principle in their
lawmaking. In these states, therefore, it may be necessary to amend
the constitution before it is possible to enact penal legislation reaching conduct which cannot be tied to an identifiable place within
the state borders.
In all other cases it should be possible for the states and the federal government to utilize any basis for legislative jurisdiction recognized in international law. However, there are two reasons why it is
unlikely that any state will do so extensively. First, there is considerable inertia behind the verbal tradition that crimes can be based
only on activity observable within the state. Second, it is difficult to
secure the physical presence of the defendant and the witnesses and
to assemble demonstrative evidence when the primary criminal activities took place outside the state. The combined effect of these
two £actors ensures that a state will act legislatively in this area only
when serious injury is being done from outside the state to interests
135. 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 86. See also ARCHBOLD 38-39.
136. § 11(1).
137. § ll(l)(a).
138. § 14. See ARCHBOLD 100-01.
139. See text accompanying notes 106-12 supra.
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in which the state is vitally concerned. The forum state is not thereby
"enforcing the penal laws of another state," the traditional bromide,140 but is penalizing activity which has a direct bearing on its
citizenry, its governmental operations, or its economy.
Legislation which has .an extraterritorial effect can of course
create conflicts with the law of the place where the prohibited activity actually takes place. However, if there is insistence on actual
rather than theoretical or hypothetical conflict, the incidence of
problem cases will be small. If there is conflict, a few simple rules
ought to provide adequate guidance: (I) A country or state can
regulate the conduct or activity of its citizens or residents at all
times, even when they are temporarily beyond its geographical limits.
(2) Offenses on board vessels or aircraft can be taken cognizance of
by the government or state of registry, though other bases of jurisdiction are also possible. (3) Activity by non-citizens or nonresidents
can be penalized when it affects an interest about which the forum
state is sufficiently concerned, at least so long as the conduct is also
prohibited in the jurisdiction in which the primary activity takes
place. (4) The preceding rule may also extend to instances in which
the attitude of the latter state or country is neutral. If the foregoing
standards were implemented, the area of conflict would be, reduced
to those cases in which the country or state in which the activity
· occurs has affirmatively required that activity of either its own citizen
or a nonresident of the forum state.
If this or a similar body of rules were utilized, the result would
not be choice of forum or jurisdiction, but rather concurrent jurisdiction. This approach probably creates fewer problems in maintaining at least one successful prosecution than does a rule which requires the absolute identification of one and only one state or nation
with power to prosecute. But the price for this substantial guaranty
against the failure to punish a person who has committed an undesired act is the possibility that he may be punished both in the
state in which his physical activity took place and in the state or
states with interests directly or indirectly affected by that activity.
The response to this problem should not be legislative abandonment
of bases for statutory jurisdiction other than the territorial principle; instead, it should be the enactment of a statute which permits
the defendant in the later prosecution to plead in bar the fact that
he has previously been punished, or perhaps prosecuted to judgment,
140. See, e.g., Flaugher v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.2d 775 (Ky. App. 1955); Commonwealth v. Lanoue, 326 Mass. 559, 95 N.E.2d 925 (1950).
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in another state or country on account of the same transaction on
which the forum prosecution is based.141 Such an approach would
prevent or restrict unfair cumulation of punishment for what, from
the offender's and society's viewpoint, is a single act or transaction.
It accomplishes by statute on the inter-jurisdictional level what
we have already accomplished at the state level under the doublejeopardy concept when venue for a single offense may be laid in two
or more counties of the same state. In short, abandonment of the
territorial principle as the exclusive basis for legislative jurisdiction
may in the long run promote, rather than impair, a needed addition
to the concept of procedural fairness.
141. MoDEL PENAL
this effect, see MODEL

CODE § 1.10
PENAL CODE

(P.O.D. 1962). For the states having provisions to
comment, p. 61 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).

